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Electronic Fund
Transfer Act
(continued from page 117)
after the bank made its decision to
restrict the Feinmans' ATM privi-
leges.
Bank Violated Act by Failing to
Remove Restriction Promptly, But
Customers Failed to Prove Actual
Damages
The court next considered the
Feinmans' claim that the bank
violated their rights under the Act
by failing to remove the restriction
on February 29 when Jeff Feinman
first requested that the restriction
be removed. The Act stated that a
bank would be liable if it failed "to
make an electronic fund transfer..
• in the correct amount or in a
timely manner when properly in-
structed to do so by the consumer."
15 U.S.C § 1693h(a)(l). The bank
routinely lifted "deny access" re-
strictions after the account holder
contacted the bank, corrected the
imbalance, and convinced the
bank that no future ATM over-
drafts would occur. Jeff Feinman
contacted the bank and made these
assurances on February 29. How-
ever, due to a bank error, the
restriction remained in effect until
Jeff Feinman's second request on
March 2.
The court found the bank's fail-
ure to remove the restriction on
February 29 amounted to a clear,
but unintentional, violation of the
Act. The court noted that section
1693h(c) of the Act limited recov-
ery for the unintentional violations
to actual damages. The court held
that because the Feinmans had
failed to prove that they suffered
any actual damages during the two
days between their first request
and the day their ATM privileges
were restored, they could not re-
cover.
Mark G. Sheridan
FLORIDA SUPREME
COURT LIMITS
DEFENSES AVAILABLE
TO BANKS IN
REFUSING TO HONOR
THEIR CASHIER'S
CHECKS
In Warren Finance P. Barnett
Bank of Jacksonville, 552 So. 2d
194 (Fla. 1989), the Florida Su-
preme Court held that a bank may
assert only its real and personal
defenses in refusing payment upon
presentment of a cashier's check
that it has issued. The bank may
not assert the defenses of a third
party to the check. The court stated
that, in order to preserve the cash-
like attributes of cashier's checks, a
bank should not be required to
evaluate the validity of the third
party's defenses and thereby act as
an intermediary between parties
disputing ownership rights to ca-
shier's checks.
Background
Pursuant to a finance agree-
ment, Warren Finance, Inc. ("War-
ren") advanced funds to Redan
Engineering ("Redan"), in return,
for which Redan assigned to War-
ren the rights to payments due
Redan under construction con-
tracts Redan held with Blossam
Contractors, Inc. ("Blossam").
Blossam issued checks to Redan,
and Redan tendered the checks to
Warren. Warren then asked to re-
ceive cashier's checks instead of
personal checks, to avoid collec-
tion problems. Redan and Warren
went to Blossam's depository
bank, Barnett Bank of Jacksonville
("Barnett bank"), and exchanged
Blossam's checks for cashier's
checks that named Redan as the
payee. Redan endorsed the checks
over to Warren, and Warren de-
posited them in its account in
another bank.
Redan claimed that, in exchange
for assigning the Blossam checks to
Warren, Warren had promised to
forward additional funds to Redan
to cover checks Redan had written
to suppliers. Warren subsequently
refused to advance these addition-
al funds to Redan, and Redan
sought to stop payment on the
cashier's checks. Redan contacted
Blossam, and Blossam, as purchas-
er of the cashier's checks, tele-
phoned Barnett bank to stop pay-
ment on the checks. Barnett bank
refused to honor the cashier's
checks when they were tendered by
Warren.
Warren brought an action
against Barnett bank in the Circuit
Court of Duval County, Florida,
alleging that Barnett bank had
wrongfully dishonored the ca-
shier's checks. Barnett bank de-
fended its refusal to honor the
cashier's checks on the grounds
that (1) Warren was not a holder in
due course, and (2) Warren com-
mitted fraud against Redan in the
underlying transaction. The trial
court ruled in favor of Warren.
The First District Court of Appeal
Reversing the trial court, the
First District Court of Appeal stat-
ed that if Warren was not a holder
in due course, Barnett bank prop-
erly refused to pay the checks
based upon Barnett bank's asser-
tion of fraud. The court remanded
the case for the trial court to
determine whether Warren quali-
fied as a holder in due course. The
First District certified to the Flori-
da Supreme Court the question of
whether the issuing bank may as-
sert the defenses of a payee against
the right of a subsequent endorsee
to receive payment on a cashier's
check.
The Florida Supreme Court
Decision
The supreme court initially not-
ed that the purpose of cashier's
checks was to act as a cash substi-
tute. Unlike a personal check,
which requires that the individual
have adequate funds, the bank is
personally liable for paying on its
cashier's checks. Parties desire ca-
shier's checks to avoid the risk of
nonpayment due to insufficient
funds in the account, a stop pay-
ment order, or insolvency. The
court then discussed two theories
developed under common law to
identify and analyze these circum-
stances. They are the "cash equiva-
lent theory" and the "note theory."
Most courts have adopted the
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"cash equivalent theory" based on
the common law rules that a ca-
shier's check is the equivalent of
cash. Under this rule, once a bank
has issued a cashier's check, the
bank may not subsequently refuse
to honor the check. These courts
recognize and uphold the impor-
tant role of cashier's checks in
promoting certainty in commercial
transactions.
Courts justify the cash equiv-
alent theory by relying upon sec-
tion 4-303 and 3-411 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code
("U.C.C."). Under section 3-411, a
certified check is accepted when
certified. Under section 4-303,
once a bank has accepted a check,
any stop payment order comes too
late to relieve the bank's obligation
to pay. By analogizing certification
of a check to issuance of a cashier's
check, the "cash equivalent theo-
ry" courts conclude that a bank
may not stop payment on its ca-
shier's check based either upon its
own defenses or those of another
party to the check.
Although the supreme court ac-
knowledged the need to preserve
the cash-like attributes of cashier's
checks, it refused to characterize a
bank's refusal to pay on a cashier's
check as a "stopping payment."
According to the court, the concept
of stop payment only applies to
relations between the bank and a
customer, as in the instance of
personal checks. A personal check
is a customer's order to the bank to
draw on the customer's own ac-
count to effect a payment; until the
bank actually carries out that order
by paying on the check, the cus-
tomer may revoke the order by
"stopping payment." In contrast, a
cashier's check is the bank's obliga-
tion on its own account, and the
bank is drawer as well as drawee;
thus, a bank cannot be liable to
itself for failing to stop payment on
the check. Similarly, the purchaser
of a cashier's check does not have
the right to stop a bank's payment
on its own check. Thus, the su-
preme court rejected the "cash
equivalent theory."
Some courts apply the "note
theory" approach to cashier's
checks. Note theory courts begin
their analysis with U.C.C. section
3-118, which deems any draft
drawn on the drawer to be effective
as a note. Viewing cashier's checks
as notes, these courts apply to the
cashier's checks the U.C.C. provi-
sions dealing with ordinary nego-
tiable instruments.
Under the U.C.C., a bank in
some circumstances may refuse to
honor a note without incurring
liability. What defenses the bank
may assert depend upon the status
of the check holder. Specifically, if
a payee or endorsee of a cashier's
check is a holder in due course,
section 3-305 of the U.C.C. limits
the bank's defenses to those that
are real to the bank. If the payee or
endorsee is not a holder in due
course, however, section 3-306 of
the U.C.C. permits the bank to
assert both real and personal de-
fenses.
In the instant case, Barnett bank
argued that because section 3-306
permits a bank to assert its real and
personal defenses, under 3-306(4)
the banks should be able to assert
any third party's defenses to the
check. Accordingly, Barnett bank
claimed it properly refused to hon-
or the check based upon Redan's
claim of fraud in the underlying
transaction.
The supreme court rejected this
argument, stating that it was not a
bank's role to determine the rights
of parties to a cashier's check, i.e.,
whether Warren defrauded Redan,
before the bank pays on the check.
Barnett bank's issuance of the ca-
shier's checks to Redan was an
entirely separate transaction, bear-
ing no relation to the underlying
dispute between Warren and Re-
dan. In support of this proposition,
the supreme court quoted from
comment 5 of section 3-306,
which, in effect, states that the
contract of the obligor bank is
simply to pay the holder of the
instrument; other persons' claims
against the holder are not the obli-
gor's concern. The obligor need not
offer a third party's claim as a
defense, according to comment 5,
because the obligor usually lacks
satisfactory evidence to decide the
issue. In addition, Barnett bank
should not be required to act as an
intermediary between Warren and
Redan.
The court then refused to adopt
the "note theory" approach be-
cause categorizing a cashier's
check as a simple note fails to take
into account its cash-like attri-
butes. The court reiterated that a
cashier's check is intended to be a
cash substitute, immune from the
difficulties encountered in collect-
ing an ordinary note. In effect, the
"note theory" approach permits a
bank to refuse payment to an en-
dorsee or payee based upon the
holder's status and requires the
holder to litigate to obtain pay-
ment on the check. This counter-
venes the very purpose of cashier's
checks, which is to eliminate the
risk of litigation to obtain pay-
ment.
In rejecting both the "cash
equivalent theory" and the "note
theory," the supreme court chose
to focus on the purpose and use of
cashier's checks, rather than their
effect. As support for its approach,
the court cited U.C.C. section
1-103, which allows for supple-
menting U.C.C. provisions with
principles of law and equity. Addi-
tionally, the court cited sections
1-102(1) and (2)(b), which man-
date liberal construction and appli-
cation of the Code to promote its
underlying purposes and policies
and to provide for expanding com-
mercial practices through custom,
usage of trade, and agreement be-
tween parties.
The supreme court determined
that, in order to reflect the com-
mercial practice of using cashier's
checks as cash substitutes, the de-
fenses available to a bank to avoid
payment must be narrowly con-
strued. The court, however, de-
clined to completely preclude
banks from refusing to honor such
checks in all circumstances. The
court thus held that although a
bank may not assert the defenses of
a third party, the bank may assert
its own real and personal defenses.
Accordingly, when presented with
a cashier's check, a bank only may
inquire as to whether the payee or
endorsee is a legitimate holder.
That is, whether the presenter has
stolen the check, or simply found a
lost check, or whether the check
has been materially altered.
The court held that because
Warren was a legitimate holder
and Barnett bank had no real or
(continued on page 120)
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Wrongful Dishonor of
Cashier's Checks
(continued from page 119)
personal defenses to assert against
Warren's claim, Warren was enti-
tled to payment upon depositing
the checks into its account. Addi-
tionally, Warren did not need to
prove that it was a holder in due
course because Barnett bank had
no real or personal defenses on the
check. Thus, the supreme court
vacated the appellate court's deci-
sion and ordered the appellate
court to reinstate the decision of
the trial court in favor of Warren.
Laura L. Giorgolo
OHIO TENANTS WHO
FAIL TO PURSUE
STATUTORY
REMEDIES DO NOT
WAIVE THEIR RIGHT TO
RECOVER DAMAGES
In Miller v. Ritchie, 543 N.E.2d
1265 (Ohio 1989), the Supreme
Court of Ohio held that by con-
tinuing to occupy a defective apart-
ment, a tenant neither waives the
landlord's duty to maintain the
property, nor waives the tenant's
right to recover damages for the
landlord's breach of that duty. The
court also held that damages
should be calculated according to
the amount by which the apart-
ment's defects and the reduction in
use lessened the leasehold's value.
Background
In 1984, Anthony and Belinda
Ritchie ("the Ritchies") entered
into an oral, month-to-month ten-
ancy lease with Dexter Miller
("Miller"), agreeing to pay $200
per month rent for an apartment in
Bethel, Ohio. During their two
year occupancy, the Ritchies com-
plained to Miller of dangerous
electrical wiring, holes in the floor,
inadequate plumbing, and no heat-
ing system. Miller generally ig-
nored the Ritchies' complaints and
only made a few repairs.
In February 1987, Miller
brought a forcible entry and de-
tainer action against the Ritchies
seeking possession of the apart-
ment and payment of back rent.
The Ritchies counterclaimed for
damages based on Miller's failure
to maintain the property as re-
quired by Ohio's Landlords and
Tenants Act ("the LTA"), Ohio
Rev. Code §§ 5321.01-.15 (1974).
Thereafter, the Ritchies voluntari-
ly vacated the apartment. The par-
ties stipulated that the Ritchies
owed Miller four months' rent, but
did not agree on the amount.
The trial court held that Miller
had violated section 5321.04(A) of
the LTA (Ohio Rev. Code §
5321.04(A)) by failing to comply
with the Ohio building code, fail-
ing to make reasonable repairs,
and neglecting to keep the apart-
ment in a safe and sanitary condi-
tion. The trial court granted judg-
ment for the Ritchies in the
amount of $3,000 plus interest and
costs, and awarded Miller $800 for
four months' unpaid rent.
The Ohio Appellate Court re-
versed, holding that the Ritchies
were not entitled to damages be-
cause they had occupied the apart-
ment for a lengthy period without
pursuing the statutory remedies
established section 5321.07 of the
LTA (Ohio Rev. Code § 5321.07).
The Ohio Supreme Court Opinion
The Ohio Supreme Court decid-
ed three issues upon review: (1)
whether the Ritchies waived their
right to recover damages by paying
rent and declining to pursue statu-
tory remedies under section
5321.07 (Ohio Rev. Code §
5321.07); (2) whether the Ritchies
waived their right to recover dam-
ages under section 5321.04 (Ohio
Rev. Code § 5321.04) by continu-
ing to occupy the apartment after
notifying the landlord of its defec-
tive condition; and (3) whether the
trial court applied the proper mea-
sure of damages.
Paying Rent Does Not Waive
Right To Recover Damages. In ana-
lyzing the first issue, the Ohio
Supreme Court looked to the pur-
pose of the LTA. The LTA placed
duties upon a landlord that did not
exist at common law. Section
5321.07 of the LTA provided to
tenants a method to redress
ANNOUNCEMENT
Child Restraints
The Center for Auto Safety
published a new report on car
child restraints. Children At
Risk- Failure of the Federal
Child Restraint Compliance
and Recall Program details the
results of the Center's study of
the National Traffic Safety Ad-
ministration's records con-
cerning child retrains. The
report found that child re-
straints are inadequate and
that the National Traffic Safe-
ty Administration did not ade-
quately enforce and oversee
the use of child restraints.
A copy of the report is
available by sending $35.00 to:
Center for Auto Safety
Publication Department
2001 S. St., N.W. Suite 410
Washington, D.C. 20009
breaches of those duties. If a land-
lord failed to meet his statutory or
contractual obligations, the tenant
had three options: the tenant could
(1) deposit the rent owed with the
court; (2) apply for a court order
directing the landlord to remedy
the condition; or (3) terminate the
rental agreement. In order to uti-
lize these remedies, a tenant had to
give the landlord written notice of
the violations and to have made all
rent payments.
The Ohio Supreme Court ini-
tially observed that the remedies
created by the LTA were not the
only recourse for tenants alleging a
landlord's breach of duty. Section
5321.07 of the LTA stated that a
tenant "may" implement the statu-
tory remedies, provided the tenant
has notified the landlord of the
code violations and the tenant is
current in rent. However, the LTA
did not limit the tenant to these
remedies because the LTA was
intended to supplement other re-
medial measures.
Although the tenant risks being
evicted by failing to pursue one of
the LTA remedies, the tenant does
not thereby waive his right to re-
cover damages for the landlord's
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